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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & LIBERTY
THE COUNTER-CLERKS
OF JUSTICE SCALIA
Ian Samuel*
"So, what are you going to do when you're done here?"
That's what he asked me first. I had just sat down in his cham-
bers, on a big, overstuffed leather couch. It was a day in early April,
and I'd spent my last few minutes sitting across the street in a park,
shuffling through the index cards I'd been using for weeks to pre-
pare. The cards were organized by topic, each with a few bullet
points to remind me of what the man across from me thought about
every subject on which he'd had an opinion over the last quarter-
century. From A (the Administrative Procedure Act) to Z (Zerbst, a
doctrine about the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights), it was
all there.
But this? He wants to know what I want to be when I grow up?
"Well," I said to Justice Scalia. "I'm thinking about becoming a
lawyer."
* The author is an attorney at Jones Day (although the views in this essay are his
own) and a former law clerk to Justice Scalia, and will join Harvard Law School as a
Climenko Fellow this summer. For their thoughtful comments and critiques on this
essay while I was writing it, I extend my thanks to Shannon McHugh, Jana Loeb, Matt
Owen, Dan Epps, Dennis Rimkunas, Adam Klein, and Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza.
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IN OCTOBER TERM 2012, I was a law clerk for Justice Scalia. When
that fact comes up in conversation (say, at a social gathering), the re-
action is almost always the same: "Cool!" people say, which is about
my view on it, too. And then (I know it's coming, and nowadays I
just wait a beat for it): "Wait .. . You're not, um ... Are you a Repub-
lican?" To get a sense of the tone -relative certainty touched with a
hint of concern-imagine asking a person seated next to you at din-
ner, "You don't have pink eye .. . Do you?"
"No," I say, trying not to sound as defensive as I feel. "I'm not."
And it's true. I am no kind of Republican. In college, I made my first
political donation to Howard Dean (ten bucks), and I've never looked
back. So no - I'm not a Republican. (The experience of being interro-
gated about this fact so many times, however, has given me a genu-
ine sympathy for the so-called "shy Tory" problem, whereby con-
servatives are nervous to admit what they think in social settings lest
they face the opprobrium of their peers.)
What, then, was I doing there? Most lawyers know that Justice
Scalia would sometimes hire a politically liberal law clerk to be one
of the four who worked for him each year. But I've found that most
people who aren't lawyers don't know that. "Oh," they'll say. "So
you were like, the token liberal?" That's essentially right (though typ-
ically people don't like being described to their faces as "tokens"). In
the parlance, the term was counter-clerk. The autumn after I worked
for him, the Justice explained his rationale for this practice in an in-
terview with New York magazine.2 "Other things being equal," he
said -"which they are usually not" -"I like to have one of the four
clerks whose predispositions are quite the opposite of mine - who
are social liberals rather than social conservatives." Such a person
was useful, in his view, "to make sure I don't make mistakes."
2 Jenifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 6, 2013), avail-
able at http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
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In other words, as the Justice frequently remarked in other con-
texts, a good textualist judge should sometimes, perhaps even often,
find himself coming to results that he finds politically bitter. As he
put it in the New York interview, that is the consequence of "paying
attention to [the] text" of the laws a judge is asked to apply, rather
than simply "playing in a policy sandbox." The Justice prided him-
self on having come to many such decisions over the years. He would
often point to the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson,3 which held
that flag burning is protected speech under the First Amendment. He
joined that opinion, which was written by one of the Court's greatest
liberals, William Brennan, and his vote was necessary for the result -
it was 5 to 4. And he joined the majority despite the fact that flag-
burning personally offended him tremendously. "If it were up to me,
I would put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo
who bums the American flag," he would often cheerfully remark.4
But, he invariably added, "I am not King." He was a judge, and the
First Amendment said what it said.
Therefore it was useful, in his view, to have someone around
whose political instincts would cause them to want flag burning to be
protected, or who would want the EPA to set clean-air standards
without regard to cost.5 A fainthearted textualist with conservative
political leanings might feel tempted to look the other way in those
cases. But that is the job of the counter-clerk, as he saw it: to stop your
boss from doing something that would be a mistake by his own lights.
You are required to speak up; your duty is to disagree, and to state
that disagreement using the Justice's methodology.
3 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
4 For just one example, see Scott Bomboy, Justice Antonin Scalia Rails Again About
Flag-Burning "Weirdoes," CONSTITUTIoN DAILY (Nov. 12,2015), http://goo.gl/XyzlzS.
For some reason, that he chose an image of someone wearing sandals -"sandals!" -
has always been a source of great amusement to me.
5 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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BUT BACK TO THE INTERVIEW. He laughed. He liked my smart-al-
ecky answer. He liked, too, that I wanted to move back to New York,
where he'd grown up and where I'd gone to law school. (Washing-
ton, he said, wasn't "a real city.") And then he gave me some advice.
When you finish here, he said, go to a law firm. "You've gotta soak
'em," he joked, referring to the signing bonuses for Supreme Court
clerks, which have grown to astonishing heights. "But," he said,
you've also got to find a place that gives you time for your "other
responsibilities." I asked what he meant. "You have responsibilities
to your family," he said. "You have responsibilities to your church.
These aren't leisure activities. These are important obligations, and
so many of these firms now work their young lawyers so hard that
they can't fulfill them." It was an arresting bit of wisdom: How often
does someone at the peak of your profession tell you not to let your
work consume your life?
But before I could really digest it, he asked me a more substantive
question: "Okay," he said, "why don't you tell me an opinion I've
written in the last couple of years that you disagree with, so we can
argue about it?" He said this with a rather mischievous smile, one I
would come to know very well. I'll spare you the back-and-forth
about the case we discussed. But at the end, he waved me off with a
laugh: "All right, all right. You picked a good one." He'd had fun,
and I had (I hoped) survived.
Shortly thereafter, he sent me up for the second part of the inter-
view, conducted by the four current clerks, though not before warn-
ing me that the tradition was for them to deliver quite a grilling, and
that-not to worry -"I don't always listen to what they say." We had
been together perhaps twenty or thirty minutes. I shook his hand and
walked out of his chambers, genuinely wondering whether I'd ever
see him again.
THE LIST OF POLITICAL LIBERALS who worked for Justice Scalia is
quite an august one. It's worth dwelling on that fact for a moment. A
Supreme Court clerkship can have a huge effect on a young lawyer's
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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career. Justice Scalia (by supplying that credential to a number of
young liberals) directly abetted the prominence of many people who
went on to use their prominence to advance goals, political and legal,
with which he didn't agree.
Yet he was proud of them, even when he didn't share their pro-
fessional objectives. I once came into chambers to inform him that
one of his former clerks, Rachel Barkow, had been named to serve on
the United States Sentencing Commission, which develops sentenc-
ing guidelines for federal judges in criminal cases. The Justice had
once derided the Commission (in dissent) as a "junior-varsity Con-
gress" that offended the Constitution's separation of powers.6 "That
unconstitutional commission?!" he said, mock-aghast. But then: "Ah,
good for her." I imagine that the Justice, who sometimes referred to
his law clerks as his "nieces and nephews" (a touching descriptor
from an only child), felt about his liberal clerks the way my Republi-
can grandfather thinks of me: Politically hopeless, and family all the
same.
Most of the time, that affection was mutual, and in the wake of
his death, the remembrances of his counter-clerks have mostly been
warm ones. For example, Tara Kole, who worked for the Justice sev-
eral years before I did, wrote that he treated her with "enormous re-
spect," that he "always seemed to value [her] opinion," that his trust
of her "felt implicit," and that she "never felt as though he looked at
[her] differently than [her] conservative counterparts." 7 Professor
Barkow wrote, on the 20th anniversary of his appointment to the
bench, that the Justice was "a valued mentor," and that "serving as
his law clerk was an honor I will always treasure." 8 And Lawrence
6 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 Tara Kole, I'm a Liberal Lawyer. Clerking for Scalia Taught Me How to Think About the
Law, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://goo.g/TWFJTr.
8 Rachel Barkow, A Scalia Clerk Remembers Her Former Boss, OBSERVER (Feb. 13,2016),
http://goo.gl/GSB7fs.
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Lessig wrote that in his time as "the only liberal clerk in the cham-
ber," he watched the Justice "struggle with [the] conflict" that came
when his originalist methodology required a more liberal result.9 The
resulting "acts of integrity," wrote Lessig, were "incredibly im-
portant to me in my becoming a lawyer," even if there were instances
in which he believed the Justice had misstepped.o
There are a handful of others, however, with a somewhat less
glowing assessment. Some of them exhibit such a boundless con-
tempt for Justice Scalia that I wonder how (and more importantly,
why) they made it through the year without resigning. Most visibly,
Bruce Hay, a law professor at Harvard, has recently written that alt-
hough he once believed the Justice "prized reason," "a more naive
young fool never drew breath."" Hay charges that Justice Scalia "de-
tested science" (because it "threatened everything he believed in"),
that he used his "intelligence and verbal gifts" as "instruments of
cruelty and persecution and infinite scorn," and goes on to accuse the
Justice of having been an enemy of women's rights, racial justice, eco-
nomic equality, environmental protection, intellectuals, universities,
anyone who questions authority, "foreignness," social change, and -
in sum-the "modern world." 12
Hay provides almost no evidence to justify these accusations -
strange, given that it is easy enough to list decisions by the Justice
9 Lawrence Lessig, Scalia Set a Principled Example, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://goo.gl/ZgBPFI.
10 Id. ("I'm not convinced he always chose originalism over conservatism.... But
whether perfectly or not, what was most striking to me was to watch someone of great
power constrain his power, not for favors or public approval, but because he thought
it right.").
11 Bruce Hay, I Thought I Could Reason With Antonin Scalia, SALON (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://goo.gl/eg3rhj.
12 Id.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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that (for example) favored environmental protection.13 It would also
be odd for a man who hated universities to teach at them nearly every
summer. Moreover, if Justice Scalia really did regard "foreignness"
as the enemy, his shelf-full of books on foreign constitutions was a
very effective disguise for that contempt. And for a foe of the modern
world, he had an awfully broad view of speech protections for video
games. 14 Then again, when a man who spoke Latin and loved opera
is charged with anti-intellectualism, then perhaps we are no longer
within the realm of what you might call reasoned disagreement.
No: Hay's project is not a close-read critique, but pure argumen-
tum ad clerkeratum. Hay claims that he knows from experience that
the aim was always to win "the culture war," and the Justice's pro-
fessed judicial philosophy was nothing other than a means to that
end. "What I took for the pursuit of reason in those chambers was in
fact the manufacture of verbal munitions," Hay fumes, and from "the
comfort of our leather chairs, we never saw the victims." That is a
charge about the Justice's character. And to sell it, Hay engages in a
pure ethical appeal: I should know, he seems to say. After all, I worked
for him.15
13 See Whitman, supra note 4; see also Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
15 Of course, if the Justice's legacy is to be settled by a swearing contest among the
liberals who knew him, was it not Justice Ginsburg who said of him that he was her
"best budd[y]," and that they were "one in our reverence for the Constitution and the
institution we serve?" Statements From the Supreme Court Regarding the Death ofAntonin
Scalia, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 15, 2016), available at
http://goo.gl/8fFTYI. Describing the time she first heard him speak, Justice Ginsburg
remarked that she "disagreed with most of what he said, but I loved the way he said
it." David Savage, BFFs Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia Agree to Disagree, L.A.
TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://goo.gl/S8Q0W5. In his essay, Hay writes that Justice
Brennan was his "hero." Most young liberals that I know-including me-would
name Justice Ginsburg as a hero, too. Which leaves us with a version of C.S. Lewis'
famous trilemma: Our hero is either lying (maybe she hated the Justice, but lacks Hay's
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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Hay chose an interesting moment to unburden himself. He
clerked for Justice Scalia in October Term 1989-almost twenty-
seven years ago. Since then, Hay has mostly been a professor at Har-
vard Law School, where he was hired just four years after graduating
(undoubtedly in no small part on the strength of his clerkship). And
yet, as far as I can tell, Hay has never before commented1 6 on the
works of a man who he now accuses of "dehuman[izing] people and
treat[ing] them as pawns in some Manichean struggle of good versus
evil." Yet, suddenly, in the wake of the Justice's death, Hay has some-
thing to say. How curious.
Hay's timing has certain advantages. For one, it spares him any
possibility of a response -real or imagined. We are all familiar with
the uncomfortable sensation of knowing that the object of our verbal
scourging might read what we write of them, and the accompanying
sense of shame. Hay's timing eliminates that bothersome twinge,
leaving him free to bask in the warm alleluias of ideological fellow
travelers. Also, because the media appetite for commentary on the
Justice was enormous following his death, Hay's timing ensured that
even a lightly organized confessional-cum-ad hominem could be pub-
lished relatively prominently. Of course, Hay's timing has some
drawbacks: for example, publishing a personal attack on someone's
character immediately after his death might cause further grief to
that person's family or his close friends. But insofar as Hay boasts of
being trained to deploy "verbal munitions. . . against civilian popu-
lations" without "thinking about what [he is] doing," I am sure that
rhetorical courage?), mistaken (maybe she did not know him as well as Hay did?
Maybe she is not as committed as Hay is to the leftist cause?), or she is right.
16 The only reference to the Justice I could find in Hay's academic writing came in
1992, when he describes one of his opinions as "hint[ing] darkly that specific adjudi-
cative jurisdiction may be required in all cases where the defendant is neither a resi-
dent of the forum state nor served with process while physically present within its
borders." Bruce Hay, Conflicts ofLaw and State Competition in the Product Liability Sys-
tem, 80 GEO. L. J. 617, 645 n.78 (1992). Damning stuff.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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he is not too bothered by that; after all, from the "comfort of [his]
leather chair[]," he will "never [see] the victims." So, in the end, per-
haps Hay chose a savvy moment to accuse Justice Scalia of "[dying]
as he lived," "killing helpless prey from a position of safety and com-
fort" -of lacking, in other words, the moral bravery of a tenured law
professor who would wait to publicly criticize a man whom he knew
personally until after his death.1 7
MORE NUANCED is the account of Gil Seinfeld, who was the Jus-
tice's counter-clerk during the Court's 2002 term.18 Seinfeld aims to
create separation both from those (like Kole) who depict the Justice
as "a paragon of integrity interested only in the dictates of legal texts"
and those (like Hay) who see him as "ready and willing to cast aside
legal texts he is bound to obey, and interpretive principles he pur-
ports to believe in, in order to make way for outcomes that are con-
genial to him personally." 19 Justice Scalia, Seinfeld says, was neither;
rather, he was "a complex man doing a complex job under a particu-
larly luminous spotlight (which, it must be conceded, he made no
effort to dim)." 20 Seinfeld praises the Justice's personal warmth and
willingness to admit mistakes; criticizes as unprincipled his view of
affirmative action; and finds downright "ugly" the Justice's "caustic
and dismissive" dissents, which Seinfeld argues would have been
17 By contrast, Professor Lessig tells us that he expressed his disagreement (stated
in rather vivid terms) face to face: "Indeed, the last time I saw him over lunch, I com-
plained to him that he had ruined me as a constitutional lawyer, because I was con-
stantly predicting he'd choose originalism over conservatism. Yet too often, I said,
when the decision came down, I felt like Linus waiting for the Great Pumpkin. Scalia
laughed his extraordinary life-loving laugh, and told me I obviously hadn't read the
cases carefully enough." Lessig, supra note 9. Certainly a different approach.
18 Gil Seinfeld, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Reflections of a Counter-Clerk, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 111 (2016).
19 Id. at 112.
20 Id.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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better had they been modeled on the "warm, respectful manner in
which he engaged me when we disagreed." 21
But Seinfeld's account is particularly interesting because of the
role he describes in one of the Justice's most famous dissents, in Law-
rence v. Texas.22 The question presented in Lawrence was whether
Texas could criminally prohibit sexual intimacy by same-sex couples.
The Court said no; Justice Scalia dissented. Seinfeld writes that he
begged off of working on the dissent at all: "I knew I'd want no part
of it. I didn't want to help hone the Justice's arguments or improve
his prose."2 Instead, he forthrightly went to the Justice and asked
"for permission to sit this one out," which was granted, and he
"made it through the rest of the clerkship without a shred of concern
that the Justice bore ill feelings about the whole thing." 24 But the
"opinion," Seinfeld writes, "still bothers me."2
The Lawrence dissent bothers a lot of people. It is this dissent to
which Hay is almost certainly referring when he speaks of a
transgender friend who has left academic physics because of what he
calls the "[b]igotry and ignorance inflamed by demagogues like An-
tonin Scalia." 26 The Lawrence dissent is likely to be Exhibit A in any
argument by a detractor of the Justice's. 27 In particular, its closing
21 Id. at 120.
- 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 123.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Hay, supra note 11. 1 do not mean to confuse the conceptually distinct issues of
sexual orientation and gender identity. But the only Supreme Court case even touch-
ing upon the latter of which I am aware is Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), in
which the plaintiff was a transgender woman who was incarcerated with the male
population at a prison. Justice Scalia did not write an opinion. So Hay's remark can
only be read as a reference to Lawrence and other cases concerning sexual orientation.
27 Exhibit B? Well: "some readers may wish to pause here to gesticulate angrily
while shouting 'Bush v. Gore! What about Bush v. Gore!' Take a moment and get it out
before we move on." Adam Klein, Justice Scalia's Legacy, LAWFARE (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://goo.gl/VuOive.
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section, which begins this way: "Today's decision is the product of a
Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has
largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I
mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed
at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct." 28 The fat, juicy target in that sentence is ob-
vious: the use of the phrase "homosexual agenda," which was (even
in 2003) so politically loaded that the rest of the sentence might as
well not be there, for most readers will not get to it. Similarly, the
dissent observes that "I have nothing against homosexuals, or any
other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic
means." 29 But, of course, the quotation is easy (too easy) to shorten to
the groan-worthy "I have nothing against homosexuals." And the
dissent observes that "many Americans do not want persons who
openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business,
as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's
schools, or as boarders in their home," because they view that "life-
style" as "immoral."30 Maybe, but ... yikes.
These passages are painful to read -not in spite of my affection
for Justice Scalia, but because of it. To readers who are gay or lesbian,
these passages were hurtful -and I am sure that the Justice (what-
ever his views on same-sex relationships) would not have inflicted
that wound except through inadvertence. In a nearly thirty-year ca-
reer on the bench, every judge is bound to commit some serious er-
rors -just ask Oliver Wendell Holmes, who remarked of forced ster-
ilization (in a majority opinion) that "three generations of imbeciles are
enough." 31 When that judge is a great one, a mistake like that is
28 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 603.
0 Id. at 602.
31 Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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(rightly) magnified in our minds, because we expect more from our
legends.
As it happens, we know for sure that Justice Scalia's views on the
Constitution's protections (or not) for same-sex relationships were
capable of being expressed in a much different way. During my
Term, the Court decided United States v. Windsor, which invalidated
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act.32 To no one's surprise, Justice
Scalia dissented. His substantive principle was the same as in Law-
rence: that the issue of gay rights was one of those issues left to dem-
ocratic resolution. But the tone was very different. The question of
same-sex marriage, he noted, had inspired "passion by good people
on all sides," and that passion had prompted "plebiscites, legislation,
persuasion, and loud voices -in other words, democracy."3 3 He dis-
agreed with the idea that "this story is black-and-white: Hate your
neighbor or come along with us." 34 He spoke of "our fellow human
beings, our fellow citizens, who are homosexual," and how terrible it
was that the majority had accused the authors of the law of acting
with "the purpose" to "degrade" or "humiliate" gay people.3 5 In a
lament I think Seinfeld might cheer, he observed how "hard" it is "to
admit that one's political opponents are not monsters."36 His stated
regret was not that the proponents of same-sex marriage had won,
but that the Court had not "let the People decide."3 7
32 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
33 Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3Id. at 2711.
3s Id. at 2708-09 (internal quotations omitted).
36 Id. at 2711. Compare Seinfeld, supra note 18, at 116 ("Think about how hard it is
to do that. For my politically active and engaged readers, especially, think about the
person you disagree with most intensely in connection with the issues that matter to
you most. And ask yourself whether you could treat that person with the sort of
warmth and affection I have described here .... It's no easy task, and I doubt if anyone
could pull it off any better than Scalia did with me.").
3 Id.
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The Windsor dissent took some left-leaning proponents of mar-
riage equality by surprise. Emily Bazelon, a prominent commentator
on the Court's work, wrote that the Justice was "surprisingly OK
with ballot initiatives and laws that have approved gay marriage,"
and that while he "doesn't share the morals of gay marriage support-
ers," he was "willing to live and let live."38 (She even described one
passage as "lovely." 39) But why was Bazelon surprised that the Jus-
tice did not object to the legalization of same-sex marriage via the
democratic process? After all, he had written in Lawrence that "social
perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every
group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of
such matters is the best," and insisted that he "would no more require
a State to criminalize homosexual acts -or, for that matter, display
any moral disapprobation of them-than I would forbid it to do so."40
I suspect that she was surprised because what she remembered from
Lawrence were its more eye-popping statements. That is what almost
everyone remembers. And they created for some a misimpression: a
man who did not believe that the rights of gay people were to be set-
tled via the political process, but who had personal animus toward
gay people qua people.
That is why I found Seinfeld's story about the Lawrence dissent
interesting. He admits, as he admitted at the time, that he did not
want to help the Justice "improve his prose." 41 I can't say that he
erred - I wouldn't presume. But I do wonder: What if he had wanted
to? Improve the prose, I mean? Of course, in the end, the Justice
wrote what he wanted to write -no one on the Court had a more
distinctive voice. But as Seinfeld notes, he was also willing to listen
3 Enily Bazelon, Wat Scalia's Vivid DOMA Dissent Gets Wrong (And What It Gets
Right), Slate (June 26, 2013), http://goo.gl/pdifHS.
39 Id.
40 539 U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Seinfeld, supra note 18, at 123.
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when his clerks thought that he was making a mistake. Seinfeld
praises as "extraordinary" his capacity "to confess error and to
change his mind" ("at least in some circumstances"), and attests that
"the Justice made me feel that he respected and valued my opinion,
that the things I had to say were worth listening to and thinking
about." 42 I genuinely wonder what would have happened if someone
had said: "Justice, not for nothing, but if you say 'homosexual
agenda,' that's where half of people will stop reading." Would a Law-
rence dissent with a counter-clerk's touch have been any different?
We'll never know. To be sure, the idea of helping a person im-
prove an opinion with which you profoundly disagree might not
sound so desirable. Some imagine the counter-clerk as being like the
protagonist in John Strand's The Originalist, which portrays a (fic-
tional) one who is meant to have worked for the Justice during my
Term. She is a ceaseless sparring partner, waging a root-and-branch
campaign from the inside, yielding nothing, a sort of mini-Brennan
crusading for the use of "living Constitutionalism" and unwritten
rights. I was not that. For one thing, as Justice Thomas once re-
marked,4 3 having a law clerk of that sort is "like trying to train a pig":
"It wastes your time, and it aggravates the pig." But Seinfeld says he
was not, either: The "role of the counterclerk was not to try to per-
suade the Justice that, say, originalism is an error," but to "help as-
sure that he was the best, truest, most straight-shooting originalist
and textualist he could be."#
Everyone, of course, has limits. If one views the Lawrence dissent
as the moral equivalent of a Dred Scott, then maybe at some point the
duty to disagree runs out. ("You know, Chief Justice Taney, do you
42 Id. at 115-16.
43 David Savage, Clarence Thomas Is His Own Man, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2011),
http://goo.gl/3T4hcC.
4 Seinfeld, supra note 18, at 117.
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think we should tone down the part about black people being 'so far
inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect?' I feel like we might lose some folks there." 45) My point is
not to criticize Seinfeld's choice, even though I think I might have
made a different one. Rather, it is that Lawrence demonstrates the Jus-
tice's wisdom in having counter-clerks in the first place. He knew, in
advance, that there would be times when he might need them for his
own good - and we can see, for ourselves, what it looked like (at least
in this instance) when he operated without one.
IT WOULD BE FAIR to ask, at this point: "So, did you ever have a
'homosexual agenda' moment-a time when you had to stand
athwart an opinion shouting 'stop?' Did you speak up?" Unfortu-
nately, the ethical obligations of clerkships forbid discussing one's
work in any detail. I will say only that there were times when we
disagreed, times when I persuaded him, and times when he per-
suaded me. (Most interesting were those instances in which his tex-
tualist and originalist instincts produced a liberal result in the first
place, and my happy task was to simply nurture those instincts.)
And, of course, there were times when he would hear me out, give
the matter thoughtful consideration, and then respond: "Write it up
my way." That's how it should be.
It is also fair to ask (given that I have critiqued everyone else's
view) what my opinion of the Justice is. As a jurist, that's an easy one:
I stand with Justice Kagan, who recently observed that Justice Scalia
will "go down as one of the most important, most historic figures in
the Court." 46 I think the implications of that are also underappreci-
ated. Legendary jurists eventually come to transcend the particular
45 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1857).
46 Elena Kagan & John Manning, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue With Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARVARD LAW SCHooL (Nov. 18, 2015), available at
https://youtu.be/dpEtszFTOTg. (The quotation occurs at 7:59.)
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controversies in which they were involved. We do not really hold
forced sterilization against Justice Holmes -not because it was not
error, but because we are far enough past the danger to forgive it.
Similarly, I think, what will endure about Justice Scalia are the thou-
sand ways, small and large, that he forever changed the way that
American judges do their work. (For instance, as Justice Kagan ob-
served, "we are all textualists now." 4 ) My prediction is that Justice
Scalia will eventually become one of the rare figures, like Holmes,
who can transcend the debate over whether he was right or wrong in
this or that case. As for the errors, even the serious errors? All
judges-all people-have them. The only question is whether they
will be forgiven (as they are for the greats) or forgotten (as they will
be for the rest of us).
On a more personal level, what will endure for me -the image I
will keep in my mind of the man, rather than the jurist -is a photo-
graph taken by the Court's official photographer at President
Obama's second inauguration. The Justice was wearing an eight-
sided hat that had been given to him as a gift; it was a replica of the
one worn by St. Thomas More, in Hans Holbein's famous portrait.
He was seated up near the podium where the President spoke, with
the other members of the Court and various eminences grises.
47 Id. (at 8:25).
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His expression is familiar and unmistakable: he is squinting and
smiling exactly the way he did on that spring day during my inter-
view. In that photograph, attending the inauguration of a Democratic
president, he is positively enjoying himself. In that portrait is the man
who wanted a political liberal around ("other things being equal,
which they are usually not"); in that portrait, too, is the conservative
hero (a Thomas More hat!). My co-clerks and I loved the photo so
much that we had prints made, which he generously inscribed to all
of us as gifts.
There will be no more counter-clerks now. But neither will there
be any young liberal who is free, whether she likes it or not, of the
Justice's influence. And as those young liberals read through their
case books, they will hear the Justice's voice on the page-inviting
them to pick an opinion they disagree with, and argue about it.
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